






In Praise of the Supporting Cast 
F.S. Oliver observed almost a century ago that a typical lawyer’s 
professional “experience of human affairs is made up of an infinite number of 
scraps cut out of other people’s lives.”1 Even as the lawyer’s professional life is 
immensely various, it remains at the same time absolutely vicarious—even as 
she encounters a wide range of clients and problems, she always acts for and 
through others rather than on her own behalf. This made Oliver a skeptic 
about lawyers’ capacities for true leadership. Lawyers, he wrote, “see too much 
of life in one way, too little in another, to make them safe guides in practical 
matters.”2 
Today, Ben Heineman rejects such self-effacement in favor of a more 
muscular conception of the lawyer’s professional role. Heineman claims that 
lawyers’ professional activities groom them to lead. And he proposes that law 
schools should “more candidly recognize” lawyers’ leadership potential and so 
change their approach to legal education in order better to develop lawyers’ 
leadership capacities, and indeed to “inspire[] young lawyers to seek roles of 
ultimate responsibility and accountability” more aggressively than they do 
today.3 
That some lawyers are also leaders is obvious, and Heineman catalogues 
familiar examples: the Founders, the Abolitionists, the Progressives, the New 
Dealers, the Cold Warriors, and the activists of the Civil Rights Era did indeed 
all include lawyers prominently among their numbers. But Heineman is after a 
stronger conclusion—that exercising leadership should become one of lawyers’ 
characteristic social functions rather than just something open to lawyers as to 
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other professionals, and indeed to citizens quite generally.4 Heineman believes 
that “[t]he core competencies of law are as good a foundation for broad 
leadership as other training” and so proposes that the aspiration to lead should 
supplant the more traditional advisory role in young lawyers’ ambitions.5 
Indeed, he confesses a “wish to redefine (or at least to re-emphasize) the 
concept of ‘lawyer’ to include ‘lawyer as leader.’”6 
This stronger proposal substantially misunderstands the lawyer’s social 
role. In making it, Heineman neglects the lawyer’s traditional virtues and 
promotes a caste of mind that is incompatible with these virtues. Moreover, 
because the lawyer’s traditional role contributes importantly to the glue that 
holds political life together, implementing Heineman’s revisionist agenda 
would have far-reaching, and dangerous, consequences—not just for lawyers 
but for society quite generally. 
i .   two species of legitimation 
One of the core functions of any legal order—and especially of legal orders 
that regulate complex, pluralist societies—is legitimation. The legal order must 
give citizens reasons to regard its decrees as authoritative even when they 
disagree with the substantive policies that the order enacts and the outcomes 
that it imposes. 
This problem is familiar in its wholesale manifestation. How is the 
lawmaking process to be rendered legitimate even with respect to those citizens 
who oppose the laws that this process produces? How must lawmaking be 
 
4.  Heineman also claims, or at least suggests, that leadership was commoner among lawyers in 
the past than it is today—for example, when he characterizes the historical examples just 
listed as reflecting generations of lawyer “leaders.” Id. at 268. But the historical record is 
more complicated in this respect than Heineman credits. At the very least, the lawyer-
leaders to whom he refers were exceptions in a bar whose representative members focused 
on much more mundane matters. And in many cases the organized bar sought actively to 
preserve the status quo, resisting the efforts of the lawyer-leaders whom Heineman 
champions. For example, although one segment of the bar was indeed instrumental in 
conceiving and implementing the administrative state, the balance of the legal profession, 
including the American Bar Association, resisted and sought to defeat the New Deal. See 
generally Charles W. Wolfram, Toward a History of the Legalization of American Legal Ethics II: 
The Modern Era, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 205, 218 (2002); Robert W. Gordon, The Legal 
Profession, in LOOKING BACK AT LAW’S CENTURY 287, 298 (Austin Sarat et al. eds., 2002). 
5.  Heineman, supra note 3, at 266. 
6.  Id. To be sure, Heineman also says that he does “not intend to diminish the fundamental 
legal role of providing services to the vast array of institutions and individuals who need 
them . . . .”  But the main thrust of Heineman’s proposals nevertheless remains precisely to 
disparage this traditional conception of the lawyer’s professional role. 
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managed in order to sustain a general obligation to obey the laws that are 
made? The solution characteristically adopted by open societies is procedural 
and participatory. Insofar as the lawmaking process is democratic, even the 
losers have reason to accept its results, roughly because the process has 
engaged them and fairly reflects their input.7 
The problem of legitimation also manifests itself at retail, moreover, in 
ways that are no less significant even if they are perhaps less commonly 
remarked. Even after a (democratic) lawmaking process has established an 
authoritative resolution to conflicts about what general principles should 
govern collective life, further conflicts will arise about how these general laws 
should be applied to the specific facts and circumstances of particular cases. A 
canonical case provides a vivid example: should a law that forbids the 
importation of foreign laborers apply to prevent a religious congregation from 
bringing a foreigner to the United States to serve as its pastor?8 A mechanism 
other than lawmaking must resolve these and myriad similar questions of 
application. And it is essential that this mechanism should produce resolutions 
that the losers regard as authoritative even as they oppose them on the merits. 
As at wholesale, so also at retail legitimation requires procedural and 
participatory practices. Among the most important of these is adjudication. 
Like democratic politics, adjudication is a form of commensuration—a process 
in which the parties to disputes agree about what resolution to live by in 
practice even as they continue to disagree about which outcome is, in principle, 
right. Adjudication achieves this legitimacy by bringing disputants into 
affective engagement with one another—an engagement that, as Lon Fuller 
once observed, has the “capacity to reorient the parties toward each other, not 
by imposing rules on them, but by helping them to achieve a new and shared 
perception of their relationship, a perception that will redirect their attitudes 
and dispositions toward one another.”9 When it succeeds, adjudication has so 
deep a transformative effect on participants that “the transformed dispute” that 
adjudication creates “can actually become the dispute”10 that disputants pursue. 
 
7.  This basic idea has been elaborated in many ways. For an initial, and still provisional, 
account of my own views, see Daniel Markovits, Democratic Disobedience, 114 YALE L.J. 1897 
(2005). 
8.  See Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892). 
9.  Lon L. Fuller, Mediation: Its Forms and Functions, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 305, 325 (1971). Here I 
am glossing over certain complexities in Fuller’s views of the different kinds of dispute 
resolution. 
10.  See William L.F. Felstiner, Richard L. Abel & Austin Sarat, The Emergence and 
Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming, 15 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 631, 650 (1980-
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Adjudication, in other words, changes disputants’ aspirations and 
reconstructs disputes in ways that ensure the legitimacy of the outcomes that it 
produces—it eliminates from disputants’ minds characterizations that cast their 
disputes as intractable, replacing them with alternative characterizations that 
are more benign. Insofar as adjudication achieves this transformation, the 
legitimacy of the legal process follows, because the reconstructed disputes and 
the resolutions that the legal process proposes have been tailored to suit each 
other, so that parties who come (through their affective engagements with the 
legal process) to see their disputes as the legal process proposes also come to 
accept the resolutions that the legal process recommends. 
Indeed, when it is most successful adjudication intercedes in social conflicts 
even before they have fully ripened into open disputes, creating in persons a 
general disposition to conceive of disputes, ab initio, on the terms that 
adjudication recommends—terms that favor their eventual legitimate 
resolution. Tocqueville long ago identified this possibility, when he observed 
that Americans tend, even in “their daily controversies,” to “borrow . . . the 
ideas, and even the language, peculiar to judicial proceedings.”11 The tort 
system provides a particularly vivid contemporary illustration of this insight. 
For all its failings, tort law has proved remarkably successful at convincing 
Americans to re-conceptualize accidents and ensuing injuries—rejecting folk 
understandings that emphasize personal honor and lost human flourishing in 
favor of much more tractable ideas about efficient precaution and money 
damages. 
ii.  lawyers as legitimators 
Lawyers are essential to adjudication’s power to achieve retail legitimation 
on this model. As Karl Llewellyn said, it is one of the “law-jobs” to sustain 
authoritative resolutions of “trouble cases”—cases in which general principles 
do not straightforwardly resolve themselves into consensus outcomes.12 
Lawyers do this job by serving as bridges between the state and its citizens and 
as buffers between competing citizens. They “objectify” their clients’ claims, 
abstracting from the clients’ narrow interests and circumstances, and 
connecting the claims to broader principles “in terms of which . . . binding 
solution[s] [to disputes] can be found.”13 They “test the reality of the[ir] 
 
11.  1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 357 (F. Bowen ed., 1862). 
12.  See K.N. LLEWELLYN & E. ADAMSON HOEBEL, THE CHEYENNE WAY: CONFLICT AND CASE LAW 
IN PRIMITIVE JURISPRUDENCE (1941). 
13.  Maureen Cain, The General Practice Lawyer and the Client: Towards a Radical Conception, 7 
INT’L J. SOC. L. 331, 343 (1979). 
the yale law journal pocket part  116:272   2007  
276 
 
clien[ts’] perspective[s],”14 sorting their clients’ claims into reasonable and 
unreasonable components. And in these ways, lawyers reconstitute their 
clients’ claims, transforming them from brute demands, which are 
fundamentally unanswerable, into assertions of right, which invoke public, 
generally applicable principles and therefore implicitly acknowledge the 
conditions of their own failure.15 In short, lawyers translate between 
disputants’ idiosyncratic native idioms and the intersubjective language of the 
state, expressed in its laws. And by doing so, lawyers help to recast disputes in 
terms that allow disputants meaningfully, and effectively, to engage each other 
in the search for an authoritative resolution. The traditional lawyer-client 
relation is thus “focused,” as Talcott Parsons observed, on the “smoothing 
over” of “situations of actual or potential social conflict.”16 
In order successfully to serve in this role, lawyers must avoid rather than 
assert leadership—living not authentically but vicariously. Whereas leaders 
promote and indeed indulge their personal judgments, lawyers must instead 
suppress them in favor of a professional ethic of fidelity to their clients: an 
ethic that emphasizes deference to clients’ purposes and accuracy in translating 
these purposes into the language of the law. Lawyers who accept this 
professional ethic aspire to what I elsewhere call negative capability—they 
suppress their own and magnify their clients’ perspectives.17 By contrast, 
lawyers who fail to achieve negative capability, and judge rather than serve 
their clients, undermine adjudication’s legitimating ambitions. Such lawyers 
will be experienced by clients as foreign and hostile, so that they disrupt rather 
than encourage disputants’ legal engagements with one another. Rather than 
establishing a form of commensuration, in which clients come to engage one 
another through the legal process, judgmental lawyers confront clients as an 
unmediated and alienating part of the process, and they therefore undermine 
rather than support the legitimacy of adjudication. 
This is not to say that fidelity and negative capability require lawyers to act 
as extreme partisans, willing to do everything that their clients ask. And the 
question of the proper extent of lawyerly partisanship remains a difficult one 
 
14.  Felstiner et al., supra note 10, at 646. 
15.  See Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 368 (1978). 
Fuller imagines a baseball player who transforms his brute claim to play catcher into a claim 
of right based on his being the best catcher available and therefore implicitly acknowledges 
that he must abandon his claim in case a more skilled catcher appears. 
16.  Talcott Parsons, The Law and Social Control, in LAW AND SOCIOLOGY: EXPLORATORY ESSAYS 
56, 63 (William M. Evan ed., 1962). 
17.  I introduce this idea to legal ethics in earlier article. See Daniel Markovits, Legal Ethics from 
the Lawyer’s Point of View, 15 YALE J.L. & HUM. 209 (2003). 
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(which I take up in great detail in a forthcoming book).18 But the authority of 
adjudication depends on lawyers whose first instinct and basic gestalt is to 
serve rather than to judge their clients. And that is not leadership but rather, at 
least in one way, its polar opposite. 
iii. not revolution but renewal 
To be sure, lawyers can experience their pursuit of negative capability as 
costly. Heineman is right to observe that “the traditional legal roles of advocate 
or counselor may have an amorality which is ultimately unfulfilling”19 and that 
the “disconnect between personal values and professional life”20 that this form 
of lawyering demands can be experienced as burdensome by those who 
practice it. Indeed, I have elsewhere argued in detail that this burden is not just 
psychological but instead has an important ethical component.21 But although 
Heineman is also right that abandoning negatively capable lawyering in favor 
of a leadership conception of the lawyer’s role can alleviate these tensions and 
allow lawyers to “achieve[] convergence between who they [are] and what they 
[do],”22 the relief for lawyers would be achieved at an unacceptably great cost 
to the legitimacy of the legal system and indeed of social and political 
arrangements more generally. 
The answer to the ethical dilemma that Heineman correctly identifies 
therefore simply cannot be to abandon the lawyer’s traditional role as 
legitimator of the decisions of others in favor of a new role as a lawyer-leader, 
that is, as herself a decider. Indeed, the political and social need for the services 
of traditional lawyers has never been greater than it is today. Although 
Heineman confidently claims that “our society is suffering from a leadership 
deficit in public, private, and non-profit spheres,”23 the truth seems more likely 
the reverse. There are today, as always, plenty of people about who are willing 
to deploy whatever power they possess in the service of their personal 
conceptions of what ought to be done. And it is a commonplace of our age that 
the executory virtues are in the ascendancy and that institutions of all sorts—
 
18.  See DANIEL MARKOVITS, TRAGIC VILLAINS: LAWYERS AND THEIR ETHICS IN THE MODERN 
WORLD (forthcoming 2008). 
19.  Heineman, supra note 3, at 267. 
20.  Id. at 266. 
21.  See Markovits, supra note 17. I develop this ethical argument in greater detail and connect it 
to the history and sociology of the legal profession in DANIEL MARKOVITS, TRAGIC VILLAINS: 
LAWYERS AND THEIR ETHICS IN THE MODERN WORLD (forthcoming 2008). 
22.  Heineman, supra note 3, at 268. 
23.  Id. at 266. 
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including a government run by one especially notorious “decider”—are 
increasingly controlled by strong, and strong-willed, chieftains. 
Insofar as there exists a deficit of practical virtue in our society, it is much 
more likely a deficit in the supporting cast—in the institutions and processes 
that might provide our leaders with wise counsel and that might manage the 
“perpetual conflicts between rival impulses and ideals” that Stuart Hampshire 
once observed arise endemically in every living system.24 These conflicts 
demand a steward who might “preside[] over the hostilities and find[] 
sufficient compromises to prevent . . . civil war or war between peoples.”25 The 
lawyer in her traditional role as wise servant rather than leader, living 
vicariously as Oliver described, was just such a steward. These reflections may 
indeed amount to a call for the bar and the law schools who train its members 
to commit themselves to a new—or at least renewed—mission. And this 
renewed mission may require a renovation of the bar, particularly given the 
tensions between the legal profession’s traditional institutions and modern, 
egalitarian ideals. But these efforts should aim to strengthen the lawyer’s 
traditional professional role as counselor (adapting that role to the ideological 
conditions of modern democratic life), and to provide the ethical resources 
needed to live in that role successfully and with integrity. They should not 
abandon this role in favor of joining an already over-crowded battle to lead. 
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